On Theoretical Truth; Generally--The "What's in the Box?" Contest

Imagine an opaque box, out of which protrudes a turn handle, causing other doodads sticking out of the box to turn around, move in and out like pistons, blow bubbles, or whatever else your imagination desires, some at a constant rate regardless of the moving of speed of the handle, others in direct relation to the speed, others in an indirect relation to the speed--and this box is the subject of a contest by which the contestants must try to determine the contents of the box. And by the way, regardless of whatever doodads the motion of which is or is not determined by the speed of the handle you have imagined, I have dibs on the box being filled with magical fairies.

Now, of all the entries into this contest, there will be three types: 1) those which cannot be used to predict the motions of the doodads based on the speed which the handle is turned, 2) those which can be refuted based upon the fact that a box with those mechanisms inside would produce different results than the one which they were attempting to describe, and 3) those which accurately predict all the motions of the doodads at all possible speeds by which the handle is turned.

Now, of the poor saps whose entries have fallen into the second category, it is fairly obvious that they are not in a position to win the contest, because their entry quite simply cannot be inside the box. These entries are inaccurate.

Of the people in the third category, some used fancy gear boxes, others pumps and tubes, others electronics. One entry was from a friend of an employee of the testers who determined which entries fell into category two, and was a theory based upon the idea that at different speeds of the handle, the contents of the box were different--and in fact identical to other entries which had worked for those speeds but were refuted for at different speeds--and great efforts were placed into proving that his friend on the testing committee had surreptitiously slipped him the testing results, but those efforts proved fruitless and the entry was allowed to stand. All of these entries were accurate.

Then, the box was opened, and the result was (yes, you guessed it) magical fairies. The response was an uproar, in which all of the fictitious entrants faced off with your humble blogger, saying that I shouldn't win for all sorts of reasons: 1) I had not named the individual magical faeries and their relationships to the doodads, I had simply guessed the category "magical fairies," and as such my entry was not a "design" within the meaning of the rules of the contest, 2) that my entry, whether facially valid or not, was not valid since it could not be tested for accuracy for the very simple reason that it did not provide any way to predict the motions of the doodads based upon the speed of the turn handle, 3) I never paid the entrance fee, 4) that the use of magical fairies to turn the doodads was in violation of labor and immigration laws, I invented the contest and was therefore an accomplice to the crime, and a person should not be allowed to profit from his crime, and 5) the whole contest was rigged from the beginning. Now, of course, the issue was resolved in my favor, since losing controversies with figments of your imagination is often considered to be a sign of insanity and I have a distaste for civil commitment.

Now, to step away from the thought experiment above, the point that I was getting at before the hopefully amusing ending is that all of the entries which accurately predicted the phenomenon which they were attempting to predict--the moving of the doodads--are all of equal standing before the box is opened. Of course, awards could be given out for "Most original entry," "cheapest design to build," "most elegant," etc., but in so far as their purpose is to accurately explain the movements of the doodads in relation to the motions of their component parts, there quite simply is no way to choose between them without opening the box. It could of course be said that it would be "impossible" for the contents of the box to change based upon the speeds which the handle turned, or to state that there would have to be an explanation of how this change were to come about (some sort of matter to energy to matter converter maybe). But the fact would remain that for all intents and purposes, this theory would be just as good as any of the others in predicting the motions of the doodads protruding from the box, regardless of how satisfying it is an explanation.

Now, the purpose of this discussion is on the use of theory to explain the behavior of phenomena, and to predict the future behavior of that phenomenon. And, considering the name of the blog, it should probably have something to do with pragmatism. And the conclusion, which hopefully does not come as any surprise by now, is that it is completely irrelevant whether the theory correctly describes the constituting mechanisms of a phenomenon, if those phenomenon are not observable. And that is just common sense; the pragmatic view is quite simply that there is no such thing as a true theory--the existence of the electron is not proved by the fact that by assuming its existence, observable phenomenon such as lightning and computer screens can be explained and predicted; but the fact that it has not been refuted by observable phenomenon recommends the theory to those who wish to design devices which create or use electrical power, and to those who want to avoid being struck by lightning.

In summation, truth is defined by, and not descriptive of, a theory--a theory is either accurate or inaccurate, complete or incomplete with regards to the data points it attempts to explain, but in so far as it postulates the existence of phenomena which are not observable in their own right, the existence of those entities are no more proved than are magical fairies, though the theories which rely upon them may be by far more preferable.